cost of trading and the offering of price improvements to informed and uninformed traders on this venue. Using an original data set, the paper shows that the marginal price improvement averages 1.49% of the option price quoted immediately before the transaction, and that this improvement varies according to order size and market liquidity. We also find that informed traders are more affected than uniformed traders by PIP related price improvements. Moreover, the price effect appears to be temporary as quoted spreads immediately after PIP related transactions revert to their previous higher level. Thus it seems that when price improvement is generated through a competitive bidding process that is not limited by the tick size, the gain to investors comes at the expense of the market maker's inventory cost represented by the bid-ask spread. other BOX designated trading participants may then compete for this order by bettering the price also by increments of one cent. All other orders can only be incremented by price intervals of five or ten cents. The Price Improvement Period lasts three seconds and must feature a higher bid price (lower offer price) than the contemporaneous bid posted on the BOX market for the same security and better than the National Best Bid Offer quote 1 . At the end of the price improvement period, the client side of the trade is matched with the best prices available on a price/time priority basis.
PRICE IMPROVEMENT AND ORDER EXECUTION QUALITY ON THE BOSTON OPTIONS EXCHANGE
This study focuses on innovations in order execution processes within the context of BOX. More specifically, it looks at BOX's PIP as a recent example of such innovation and examines its impact on transaction execution quality and quoted bid-ask spreads on that venue. Since PIP allows order flow providers to compete regardless of the usual minimum tick size, it is expected to have a spread reducing effect on options quotes.
Furthermore, contestable markets notions suggest that if PIP allows additional competition in order executions, irrespective of the minimum tick size, the quality of such executions should be improved on the market that introduces this innovation.
This study expands the current literature on the effectiveness of new competitive innovations in trading mechanisms introduced recently in financial markets by empirically testing the impact of PIP on BOX order execution quality. In this regard, historical information provided on the BOX web site boasts a PIP related price improvement averaging 2$ per contract as of the time of this study 2 . A first contribution of this paper is to validate this claim in a multivariate setting and to analyse the way potential price improvements vary according to market liquidity and order size. A 1 Broker dealers who are unable to initiate a PIP but wish to offer to their clients access to it, can submit their orders through any BOX Order flow provider or other BOX Participant. In this way, PIP can be accessible to all investors. 2 As of November 2006 their price improvement claim on the BOX web site increases to 3.23$ per contract.
second contribution of the paper to the current literature is to investigate whether BOX's order execution innovation is associated with diminishing quoted spreads and increasing execution quality on that market. A third contribution is to asses the extent to which PIP related price improvements are offered to informed rather than to uninformed traders on BOX.
In this paper we use an original dataset obtained from BOX to compare and contrast execution quality for PIPed transactions and non PIPed transactions on that venue, mainly through their impact on bid-ask spreads. The paper shows that the marginal PIP-related price improvement averages 1.49% of the option price quoted immediately before the transaction, and that this improvement varies according to order size and market liquidity. We also find that informed traders are more affected than uniformed traders by PIP related price improvements. Moreover, the price effect appears to be temporary as quoted spreads immediately after PIP related transactions revert to their previous higher level.
Accordingly, the next section presents the background of the study, followed by a survey of previous studies dealing principally with competitive options markets. Section II describes the data and presents the methodology of the research. Section III sets out the empirical results of the price improvement issue and analyses them. Concluding remarks are presented in the last section.
IBackground and review of the literature
The issue of price improvement in options markets brings into focus the quoted bid-ask spread as it is arguably the most cited indicator of trading costs. The quoted spread is usually defined as the difference between the Bid and Ask prices. It differs from the effective spread which is defined as the difference between the transaction price and the mid point of the quoted spread, and from the traded spread which is measured as the difference between average prices of trades on the Ask and on the Bid side (Stoll, 2000) . As mentioned by Stoll, in most empirical studies, stocks quoted proportional spreads have consistently exhibited a negative relationship to stock price and to measures of trading activity, and a positive relationship to stock volatility. In addition, Stoll also shows that stocks effective and quoted spreads are highly correlated (to the tune of 99%) and concludes that the two measures are equivalent.
As regards the components of stocks' quoted bid-ask spreads, it is now a commonplace observation that they are: order processing costs, inventory costs, and asymmetric information costs (Huang & Stoll, 1997; Khoury et al., 1991; Stoll, 1989) . As summarized by Stoll (2000) , a first group of studies has focussed on inventory holding costs associated with the fluctuating level and lack of diversification of liquidity suppliers' inventories (Amihud & Mendelson, 1980; Ho & Stoll, 1980; Stoll, 1978 Stoll, , 1989 . More precisely, these studies emphasise, in the spirit of Demsetz (1968) , real economic sources expended to execute trades, namely order processing costs, inventory costs as well as market power. Other researchers focused on the component of the spread that arises when liquidity suppliers deal with informed traders. In this regard, the quoted spread provides liquidity suppliers with protection against losses when dealing with superior information traders (Kyle, 1985; Easley & O'Hara, 1987; Glosten & Milgrom 1985; and Glosten 1994) and when dealing with those who are quick to act on new information by trading on posted quotes before they are changed (Copeland & Galai 1983) . However as Stoll (1989 Stoll ( , 2000 has shown, the empirical decomposition of the spread reveals that order processing costs, inventory costs and asymmetric information costs are the three components of the spread. Indeed, the market maker must quote a spread that maximises his profit from transactions from the two types of investors mentioned before, while allowing his portfolio to earn a return compatible with its level of risk.
With regard to options markets, the study by Khoury et al. (1991) presents a complete decomposition of the quoted bid-ask spread of options into its determinants. Of all the factors affecting option bid-ask spread, the option price (representing the capital invested in the specialist's inventory), the continuity of the option market, and whether the option is in-the-money or not (reflecting the degree of transmission of the underlying security's liquidity characteristics to the option) show up as the most important determinants of bid-ask spreads. Their results also reveal that the specific risk of the option is overshadowed by that of its underlying security and that the volume of transactions and the continuity of the options market seem to characterise its level of activity which has a negative effect on the spread 3 .
Similarly, by extending Ho and Stoll's model (1983) to an option pricing framework, Berkman (1992) also finds evidence on the Amsterdam Stock exchange of a negative relationship between the absolute bid-ask spread and trading activity and a positive relationship with the value of the option, its delta, and with the return volatility of the underling security.
3 It should be mentioned that the authors noted that the Mahalanobis distance allows them to identify four strata of concentration in the residuals of a bid-ask spread regression based on volume of transactions.
Examining the quoted spread on the S&P 100 Index Options, George and Longstaff (1993) find that it is positively related to the option's price and remaining days to maturity and negatively related to its delta and its level of trading activity. With respect to trading activity, the authors suggest that the option's remaining term to maturity and nearness-to-money are the determinants of the level of activity in options markets. In their analysis they find a negative relationship between the level of activity in options and both their term-to-maturity and nearness-to-money. Pinder (2003) & Stoll, 2001; Stoll, 2000; Chou, 2005) . In regards to options markets, Neal (1987) Neal (1992) finds that for low volume options, spreads are narrower on an exchange structured around specialists than on an exchange designed around competitive market makers. The opposite is true for options with relatively high volume of transactions. These results are consistent with the theoretical results of the model by Grossman and Miller (1988) . Pinder (2003) , on the other hand, finds that spreads are narrower when market makers are obliged to maintain a continual presence in the market. 4 The volatility of the volume of transactions makes it impossible to estimate with any reasonable precision the level of transactions after which interlisting has no impact on the bid-ask spread. Nevertheless, the author suggested that 1 500 options per day is the threshold after which competition no longer reduces the bid-ask spread. 5 It is interesting to note that option risk was also proxied by the variance of its quotes in this study. The results show that the coefficient of this measure of volatility is also positive and highly significant.
II-Data and methodology
The recent introduction of PIP provides a timely testing ground for order execution process innovations. In the context of this new process, specific contracts can be traded either through PIP or through more conventional channels, which allows for a model design that controls for the contracts' trading media. In addition, although only a restricted list of member firms may initiate a PIP, other order flow providers can access the process indirectly through those firms. This provides accessibility for all investors to potential price improvements. Overall, 14.42% of our sampled transactions were executed using PIP. By concentrating on the transactions of a single exchange any distorting effects arising from differences between exchanges is also minimized. An alternative sample design would have been to compare transactions on BOX to the national best bid and offer quotes (NBBO), in order to assess the equilibrium effect of PIP on the overall options market in the U.S. Though interesting, this issue falls however outside the scope of this paper. It should also be noted that all contracts in the sample of this study included both PIPed and non-PIPed transactions for the same secutity. Futhermore, as will be specified later on, the estimation methodology adopted in the paper adjusts for the panel nature of the data which also includes contract specific effects.
To estimate the impact of PIP we have used data of actual transactions and Quoted spreads were then matched with each transaction and analyzed using a variation of typical inventory based models. As mentioned in Neal (1987) , using quoted spreads assumes that they remain valid representations of the markets expectations at any given time. Alternatively, a more restrictive assumption can be used, namely that quoted spreads remain valid so long as they are unchanged. Although the sample emphasizes contracts that are most traded on any given day, quoted spreads could become invalid if the time between the last quote and the order's execution is excessively long. The sample design will therefore limit the delay between quoted spreads and actual transactions to a maximum of 15 minutes. Upon inspection, only 17 observations do not meet this criterion. Furthermore, the sample is filtered to exclude zero bid price and positive ask price quotes which represent approximately 2% of total observations. Such observations truncate the distribution and bias the spread towards zero. 6 The number of specific contracts included in the sample varies from 150 to 250 for each of the sampled working days. All transactions relating to these contracts are included in the initial sample. The final sample is obtained by excluding 593 observations due to lack of control data availability. Unreported descriptive statistics show that excluded observations do not materially differ from included ones. Spreads are thus more likely to be positively related to price although less so for lower priced options. Alternatively, market uncertainty measured by implied volatility, denotes order flow provider risk, which is expected to be associated with related to wider quoted spreads. The nearness-to-money
as defined in equation (1) and time-to-maturity provide alternative measures of order flow provider risk and have been shown to be negatively related to trading activity, which in turn should lead to larger quoted spreads.
On the other hand, nearness-to-money and time to maturity are positively related to the option price, which leads, by construction, to smaller proportional quoted spreads. The net impact of these two variables will thus depend on the trade off between the trading activity effect and the price effect.
Apart from its impact on options spreads, PIP can also be analyzed through its impact on order execution quality as measured by the cost of trading.
This second aspect is important since transactions could take place inside the quoted spreads which reduces their validity as a measure of real spreads.
Moreover, the significance of the results based on quoted spreads may be further reduced if wider quoted spreads lead to more transactions being executed within such quotations. On the other hand, the examination of execution quality also brings into focus the working of non-price competition. Neal's (1987) paper introduces a measure of order execution quality defined for each transaction by:
One of the spurious effects of equation (2) is that larger quoted spreads, other things equal, necessarily result in better execution quality as measured by Z. To avoid this effect an alternative measure of execution quality is defined as follows:
Equation (3) (4) follows from the definition of Y which represents the effective spread in proportion to the option's mid price.
III -Empirical Results

Effect of PIP on quoted spreads
The empirical analysis begins with an examination of the PIP effect on Where appropriate, parameter standard errors are adjusted according to White (1980) which assumes heteroskedastic error terms of unknown form. Table I presents the results of the PIP effect on spreads. These results are consistent with anticipated price improvements effects and previous empirical research. The negative coefficient estimates on price is to be expected since spreads are defined in proportion to prices. Interestingly, the price impact on low priced option proportional spreads is positive likely 9 The estimated autoregression coefficients are less than 0.1 for the second lag and after.
reflecting the incidence of the minimum tick size constraint. Table I also reveals that quoted proportional spreads are positively related to the implicit volatility of the underlying security, which provides a proxy for market risk.
These findings are consistent with previous studies such as those of Neal (1992), Berkman (1992), Khoury and Fischer (2000) , and Pinder (2003) . Other results show that option proportional spreads are negatively related to the remaining time to maturity. This result is to be expected since the remaining time to maturity is positively related to option prices which, in turn, are negatively related to the measure of proportional spreads by construction. This shows that the price effect dominates the trading activity effect when the possibility of PIPed transactions exists. This in turn explains the apparent contradiction between our findings and those of Chan and
Pinder (2000) and Pinder (2003) who define the spread in their model on an absolute rather than proportional basis. Table I also shows that option proportional spreads are positively related to the nearness-to-money measure. This result is consistent with that of George and Longstaff (1993) who show that nearness-to-money is positively related to trading activity and thus to investor interest in the option. As the option attracts a larger investor base, order flow providers are more likely to maintain continuous quotes on the option, which, as demonstrated in Chan and Pinder (2000) and Pinder (2003), results in narrower spreads. This shows that, in our model, for the nearness-to-money variable whose absolute value increases as the price of the underlying security moves further away from the strike price, the trading activity effect seems to dominate the price effect.
Persistency of PIP-related spread changes
It is also interesting to examine the persistency of spread changes following a PIP-related order execution by analyzing the percentage change in quoted spreads before and after a transaction is executed. More specifically, for non-PIP order executions the last quoted spread before the order is subtracted from the first quoted spread after the transaction is executed and this difference is then divided by the last quoted spread before the transaction. For PIP order executions, the last quoted spread before the PIP is initiated is subtracted from the first quoted spread after the transaction is executed and this difference is then divided by the last quoted spread before the PIP is initiated. Table II indicates that spreads immediately after PIP order executions, revert in the median to the level immediately before the transaction. The median relative change in quoted spreads is 0.00 for PIPed order executions and -0.50 for non PIPed order executions. Table II also provides additional evidence of spreads' lack of sensitivity to PIP order executions. Results indicate that the common effect is more than fully offset by PIP. The observed reversion effect decreases with spread and daily volume. The table also shows that the relative change in spreads following order executions is negatively related to price and to the quality of trade executions while it is positively related to volume, spreads immediately before the order execution, and the combined effect of implied volatility and spreads. Table III presents the results of the constrained model specified in equation 4. As the results show, the quoted absolute spreads are positively related to the measure of transaction quality. Larger spreads are thus associated, on average, with poorer subsequent transaction quality. The financial literature suggests that larger spreads, other thing equal, may be market makers' reaction to the presence of informed or speedy traders, which in turn could explain that they would be less likely to make additional price concessions in order executions. Table III approximately here The average effect of daily volume of transactions on execution quality is somewhat less obvious. Results show that it is not possible to conclude that the average effect on the daily number of transactions, as a proxy for market liquidity, has a statistically significant effect on the quality of order execution. This may result from the sample design, which biases towards more liquid contracts where additional volume may have less marginal impact on order execution quality. However, the marginal effect of volume on PIP transactions is negative and statistically significant. This means that although overall market liquidity does not affect execution quality on average for the most liquid contracts in a statistically significant manner, additional volume leads to better execution quality when a PIP is initiated. Other results also show that transaction quality is positively related to implied volatility of the underlying security returns 10 . This finding is consistent with that of Stoll (2000) , which indicates that there are more opportunities for price improvements in volatile stocks. This positive effect of volatility remains even after controlling for its potential effects on both spread and volume. In addition, results show that the option's price is negatively related to the Y measure. This finding is expected by construction. A more interesting result is that for low priced options, higher quoted option prices lead to poorer transaction quality. This finding contradicts that of Stoll (2000) for the stock market, where the opportunity for price improvement is greater for low priced stocks.
Effect of PIP on transaction execution quality
The nearness-to-money of the option is also positively related to the Y measure, meaning that the more the option is in the money the better the quality of order execution 11 . This result is not surprising since the nearnessto-money measure we use is negatively related to the option's trading activity. This means that as the price of the underlying security moves closer to the strike price and trading activity increases accordingly, as shown by George and Longstaff (1993) , order flow providers will tend to provide quotes more frequently than otherwise, thus reducing their spread. Similar show that this impact is positive and significant. Furthermore, the combined price effect for small prices is also negative and significant. Thirdly, the impact of quoted spreads on execution quality is statistically significant, except for very large trades.
Just as important is the question of the extent to which informed and uniformed traders benefit from PIP related price improvements. If we assume that smaller trades of 5 contracts or less are more heavily weighted towards uninformed traders while very large trades of 500 contracts and more are more heavily weighted towards informed trades, it is possible to infer the extent to which these two categories of traders are affected by PIP.
As shown in Table IV , informed traders seem to benefit to a larger extent from PIP related price improvements than uninformed traders. At first sight, this result may seem counterintuitive, since it could be expected that order flow providers would face less asymmetric information risk when dealing with uninformed traders than with informed traders, and would therefore be more inclined to offer PIP related price improvements to the former group.
Our result is however consistent with the finding of Table III mentioned earlier to the effect that in the presence of greater volume, order flow providers may be more willing to offer price concessions related to PIP as they can make up foregone profits through additional volume. It is worth noting that the findings that price improvement generated by PIP increases with the size of trades and the degree of daily liquidity contradict those reported in earlier studies for price improvement opportunities that are not generated through competitive processes similar to that of PIP. For example, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1995) reported that improvement opportunities on the NYSE decline with the size of trade and that they first increase and then decrease with order size for non-NYSE market makers who pay for order flow. In this sense, PIP represents a competitive innovation different from previous price improvement market processes.
IV -Conclusion
This study examines the impact of an options market innovation arising from the Price Improvement Process introduced by the Boston Options Exchange on options spreads, the quality of order execution as measured by the cost of trading and the offering of price improvements to informed and uninformed traders on that venue. The process provides an interesting opportunity to study the impact of an innovative competitive trading structure on market transactions in the venue that introduced the innovation. The study uses a variation of inventory based bid-ask spread models to estimate the impact of the new process using a large sample of 10 864 orders that were executed in December 2004.
The main findings of the paper are first that the price improvement generated by PIP averages 1.49% of quoted prices on the Boston Options
Exchange. This finding point to the fact that the order execution quality on BOX is enhanced in the presence of PIP and that the average price improvement falls within the minimum tick size. Secondly, the PIP-related price improvement ranges from a low of 1.26% of quoted prices for small trades of 5 contracts and less to a high of almost 3.07% for very large trades of more than 50 contracts. This result indicates that PIP-related price improvements affect informed traders more than uninformed traders, which is consistent with the notion that order flow providers may be more willing to offer price concessions when they can make up foregone profits on greater volume. Thirdly, daily liquidity has a marked impact on the extent of the PIP related price improvement. Thus, the marginal liquidity-related improvement ranges from 1.27% of quoted prices for very low liquidity days where 150 and less contracts are traded to a high of 2.86% for very high liquidity days where more than 500 contracts are traded. All this evidence supports the conclusion that PIP-related price improvement is sensitive to market liquidity.
Thus it seems that when price improvement is generated through a competitive bidding process that is not limited by the tick size, as in PIP, the gain to investors comes at the expense of the market maker's inventory cost represented by the bid-ask spread. The findings also lead us to suspect that market makers may integrate the likelihood of potential PIP-related losses in their equilibrium quoted spreads in general. Furthermore, the improvement generated by PIP takes place after all other price improvement possibilities associated with conventional channels are exhausted and market makers are more willing to provide price improvements the more markets are uncertain and are less willing when the option is closer to the money. On the other hand, PIP related price improvement is associated with larger volume of transactions and days of greater liquidity, which provides market makers with the opportunity to make up for lower execution prices. In the same vein, the impact of PIP appears to be temporary since spreads immediately after a PIP order execution revert to the level immediately before the transaction. This new evidence has not been observed before in studies of markets that do not operate with this new competitive trading structure. As a whole, these findings provide a better understanding of the implications of the competitive trading structures in options markets.
To conclude, it is interesting to note that some market participants have This table provides results for a model that estimates the impact the the percentage change in quoted spreads before and after a transaction is executed. More specifically, for non-PIP order executions the last quoted spread before the order is subtracted from the first quoted spread after the transaction is executed and this difference is then divided by the last quoted spread before the transaction. For PIP order executions, the last quoted spread before the PIP is initiated is subtracted from the first quoted spread after the transaction is executed and this difference is then divided by the last quoted spread before the PIP is initiated. The model regressors include Volume, the total daily trading volume per contract, DTT, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the matched transaction uses the price improvement process and 0 otherwise, Price, the average of bid and ask prices, DNP, an indicator variable equal to 0 if option price is greater than 50 cents and 1 otherwise, Volatility, the implied standard deviation of the underlying stock return, M, the absolute value of the underlying stock price minus the option's strike price, T, the remaining number of days until the option expires. (4) that estimates the impact on the absolute value of the transaction quality measure, where the measure is equal to the effective spread immediately before the trade execution divided by the average between the bid and ask prices. The model regressors include Volume, the total daily trading volume per contract, DTT, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the matched transaction uses the price improvement process and 0 otherwise, Price, the average of bid and ask prices, DNP, an indicator variable equal to 0 if option price is greater than 50 cents and 1 otherwise, Volatility, the implied standard deviation of the underlying stock return, M, the absolute value of the underlying stock price minus the option's strike price, T, the remaining number of days until the option expires. (4) that estimates the impact on the absolute value of the transaction quality measure, where the measure is equal to the effective spread immediately before the trade execution divided by the average between the bid and ask prices. Each of model (4) effects is the segregated according to trade size by multiplying each regressor by one of the following segregating variables TRADEVOL5, defined as those transactions where 5 contracts or less are traded, TRADEVOL10, the transactions where 6 to 10 contracts are traded, TRADEVOL50, the transactions where 11 to 50 contracts are traded, TRADEVOL51+, the transactions with more than 50 contracts.The model regressors include Volume, the total daily trading volume per contract, DTT, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the matched transaction uses the price improvement process and 0 otherwise, Price, the average of bid and ask prices, DNP, an indicator variable equal to 0 if option price is greater than 50 cents and 1 otherwise, Volatility, the implied standard deviation of the underlying stock return, M, the absolute value of the underlying stock price minus the option's strike price, T, the remaining number of days until the option expires. (4) that estimates the impact on the absolute value of the transaction quality measure, where the measure is equal to the effective spread immediately before the trade execution divided by the average between the bid and ask prices. Each of model (4) effects is the segregated according to total daily volume by multiplying each regressor by one of the following segregating variables: TOTALVOL150, transactions where the total daily number of trades is 150 contracts or less, TOTALVOL200, transactions where the total daily number of trades is between 151 to 200 contracts, TOTALVOL250, transactions where the total daily number of trades is between 201 to 250 contracts, TOTALVOL500, transactions where the total daily number of trades is between 251 to 500 contracts, TOTALVOL501+, transactions where the total daily number of trades is greater than 500 contracts. The model regressors include Volume, the total daily trading volume per contract, DTT, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the matched transaction uses the price improvement process and 0 otherwise, Price, the average of bid and ask prices, DNP, an indicator variable equal to 0 if option price is greater than 50 cents and 1 otherwise, Volatility, the implied standard deviation of the underlying stock return, M, the absolute value of the underlying stock price minus the option's strike price, T, the remaining number of days until the option expires.
TOTALVOL150
0.0554 0.0259 TOTALVOL200 0.0187 0.5935 TOTALVOL250 0.0564 0.1307 TOTALVOL500 0.0933 0.0000 TOTALVOL501+ 0.0772 0.0000 VOLUME*TOTALVOL150 0.0001 0.4335 VOLUME*TOTALVOL200 0.0002 0.2282 VOLUME*TOTALVOL250 2.89E-05 0.8601 VOLUME*TOTALVOL500 -1.65E-05 0.6412 VOLUME*TOTALVOL501+ 3.47E-07 0.8819 VOLUME*DTT*TOTALVOL150 -8.03E-05 0.8001 VOLUME*DTT*TOTALVOL200 -0.0003 0.4124 VOLUME*DTT*TOTALVOL250 -0.0015 0.0354 VOLUME*DTT*TOTALVOL500 4.83E-05 0.5163 VOLUME*DTT*TOTALVOL501+ 
